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first revealed to his closest followers that he himself was the prophet whose advent the Bab had promised. Shortly thereafter, the community divided, the majority siding with Janab-i Baha', who now made his prophetic claims public and called himself "Baha' Allah". Also in 1863, and at the request of the Iranian government, the Ottoman government summoned the two brothers and their followers from Baghdad to Istanbul. After a short while, the Babis were sent from Istanbul to Edirne. Since that time, the Baha'i community, which currently numbers between six and seven million members, has been led by a democratically elected institution.
Baha'is believe in successive manifestations of the Divine through human prophets. The manifestation of God through prophets never ceases; thus, there is no "last prophet", as there is no final revelation or Holy Book. According to the Baha'i faith, every prophet has a mission that lasts for a specific period of time, until a new stage of human progress requires a new prophet. The revelations given to the prophets teach the eternal divine truth in a manner that is adapted to their mission and to the capacity of human understanding at their time. Thus, Baha'is consider Muhammad a prophet and the Qur'an a divine revelation, but they believe that the Qur'an has been superceded by the teachings of the Bab and those of Baha' Allah, which are best adapted to the present time and include all former revelations.
Apart from these theological doctrines, which are highly offensive to Muslims, the Baha'i faith differs from Islam in ritual and religious law, making it clear, even to a superficial observer, that the Baha'i faith is not an Islamic sect, but an independent religion.1
The first Iranian Baha'is came to Egypt during the 1860s. Two of these immigrants converted to the Baha'i faith a number of mostly Iranian inhabitants of al-Mansuriyya. Around the year 1894, 'Abd al-Baha' made a more organized attempt to spread the Baha'i faith in Egypt by sending to Cairo Abu al-Fadl al-Gulpayagani, who had been a Muslim scholar before his conversion to the Baha'i faith. AlGulpayagani taught at the Azhar mosque, initially concealing his Baha'i identity, and convinced fifteen or more Azhar students and teachers to become Baha'is. The small Baha'i community attracted the attention of the eminent Salafi, Rashid Rida, who attacked the Baha'i faith in al-Mandr several times.2
The Baha'i faith received widespread publicity in Egypt for the first time in 1910, when 'Abd al-Baha' arrived in the country for a lengthy stay in Alexandria, to which he returned several times until the year 1913. Whereas parts of the secular press and many liberal, modernist intellectuals were impressed with 'Abd al-Baha's personality and worldview, the Islamic institutions and the religious press reacted in a hostile manner.3 The first Egyptian fatwas on the Baha'i faith date from this time.
From the 1920s onward, the Egyptian Baha'i community flourished. It established a National Spiritual Assembly (NSA) with nine elected members and created a publishing house. At the same time, Egyptian Baha'is tried to acquire government recognition as an independent religion. They codified Baha'i personal status law and petitioned Parliament to grant them the status of a milla, a religious community with the right to apply their own religious law in matters of personal status. Although unsuccessful, the Baha'is tried to create facts on the ground by drafting Baha'i marriage contracts4 and issuing Baha'i marriage certificates.5
By the end of the 1950s, Egyptian Baha'is numbered around 5,000 persons, including former Muslims, Christians and Jews, with local groups in twenty-four towns.6 The NSA built a new center in Cairo that had been designed by Egyptian Baha'is.7 However, Nasser's reign brought a stop to the community's development. In 1960, presidential decree No. 263 ordered the dissolution of all Baha'i institutions and made the continuation of their activities liable to punishment, with prison terms of up to three years. Baha'i community property was seized by the state and given to the state-controlled "Societies for the Preservation of the Holy Qur'an".
At this point, Egyptian Baha'is stopped their attempts to gain official recognition and to apply their own religious law. In accordance with the law, they have refrained from organized activities until the present time. Still, there are probably several thousand Baha'is in Egypt today.
Egyptian muftis, fatwas and courts on the Baha'i faith
The Baha'i faith poses a challenge to Muslim theologians and to Islamic jurisprudence.
Because of their belief in a post-Qur'anic revelation, Baha'is cannot be classified as "people of the book", like Christians and Jews-from the Muslim perspective, the Qur'an is God's final revelation. Furthermore, unlike Hindus and certain other religious groups conquered by Muslims in former times, Baha'is cannot be tolerated as a people clinging to a traditional religion who have not yet gained sufficient 4 There are no clear rules that would make a Baha'i marriage contract contradict Islamic law. The text of the contract usually refers to the Baha'i faith and uses religious formulae like Yd Baha' al-Abhd. As will be seen below, the validity of Baha'i marriage contracts was contested not because of their contents, but for procedural reasons: according to Egyptian law, the Baha'i Spiritual Assemblies were not competent to draft, witness or register marriage contracts. Many Egyptian Baha'is married among each other and had children born and raised in the Baha'i faith. This raises the question of the status of an apostate's descendants. Of the muftis, again it was only al-Qaradawi who addressed this problem, referring to a court ruling of 195230 (see below) which held that the descendant of an apostate may be regarded either as an apostate from birth, or as a Muslim from birth; in the latter case, he too becomes an apostate if he decides to adhere to his parents' religion after reaching the age of fifteen. In any case, after reaching adulthood he may never be considered a legitimate adherent of the Baha'i faith.31 It is noteworthy that Rashid Rida and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the only muftis without an official function, were also the only ones who dealt with cases other than the one of a Baha'i convert from Islam. brought a hisba case33 before the local Shari'a Court. The case concerned three male converts to the Baha'i faith who were of Muslim origin and were married to Muslim wives. The plaintiffs held that these Baha'is were apostates and that their marriages were therefore null and void. Both the Shari'a Court and the Appellate Court of Biba confirmed this claim. The Appellate Court emphasized that the Baha'i faith was independent of Islam; therefore, the defendants were apostates. Paradoxically, this judgment was hailed as a victory by Baha'is worldwide, who regarded it as a milestone in their efforts to be recognized as a religion instead of a Muslim reform movement 33 Hisba is the Qur'anic principle of "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil". Until 1996, Egyptian civil law allowed a popular action based on hisba: Anyone might file an action in a case that constituted a violation of the "rights of God", even when the plaintiff was not involved in the case and had no personal interest in it. A common type of hisba action was the claim for the dissolution of an apostate's marriage. When the Abu Zayd case (1993-96) made it obvious that Islamists increasingly were exploiting the hisba procedure for political purposes, the legislator abolished the hisba action as a means for a third party to take personal status cases to court; the plaintiff is now required to have a personal and direct interest in the action. The plaintiff, a Baha'i employee of the Egyptian railway authority, married a Baha'i woman in 1947 and then applied for the marriage allowance to which he was entitled, supporting his claim with a marriage contract that followed Baha'i religious law and was witnessed at his Local Spiritual Assembly (LSA). The government did not respond to his request. When the plaintiff's first child was born in 1948, he applied for a family allowance, again without receiving a reply. He therefore sued his employer, the Egyptian government. In response to his claim, the government produced two fatwas, one by the Azhar fatwa committee and one by the Grand mufti. These fatwas supported the government's claim that the plaintiff's marriage was null and void on the grounds of apostasy, irrespective of the religious affiliation of the spouse.
The Administrative Court began by examining the case in the light of Islamic law and only then raised the question of whether or not Islamic law is applicable to the case, leaving the issue of the constitutional right to freedom of belief until the end. The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument that he had a right to equal treatment with dhimmis, as the rights of dhimma40 are reserved for Christians and Jews, all other religions being heresy and unbelief (zandaqa wa-kufr). The court regarded the plaintiff as an apostate, whether he had been born Muslim or Baha'i. Thus, according to shari'a law, his marriage was null and void. The child's status was also described as "null and void" (batil) by the court.
The plaintiff held that shari'a law was not relevant to the case, because if the legislator had wished to make the apostate's status subject to shari'a law, he would have included the death sentence for apostates in the penal code. The court replied that Egypt's secular laws were not intended to replace the shari'a, but rather to codify and complete it. In the court's opinion, it is regretable that some of the hadd punishments41 have been neglected, but it is still obvious that Art. 149 of the Constitution of 1923, which declared Islam to be the religion of the state, established the supremacy of the shari'a over secular laws. This assessment of the relationship between shari'a and secular laws, long before Art. 2 of the Constitution of 1971 came into force, is based on an extremely broad interpretation of Art. 149, the argumentative basis of which is thin, as far as it is provided in the judgment. The court went on to discuss the relevance of Arts. 12 and 13 of the Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of belief as well as free exercise of religious rites. After analyzing the protocols of the Constituent Assembly, the court concluded that the legislator did not intend these articles to protect the change of an individual's religion or his adherence to a religion that is not recognized by the state. It therefore dismissed the complaint.42
The validity of marriage contracts between two Baha'is remained a contested issue. In several cases, Baha'is tried to register their marriage contracts at the public registration office.43 These attempts were rejected, either because a "Christian" man had married a "Muslim" woman or because there was no authority competent for registering such marriages.44 The State Council's fatwa department issued a statement on this issue in 1952. The fatwa, at first sight, appears to open the door to a more liberal understanding of the principle of freedom of belief, but it does not solve the legal problem. The statement argues that the registration offices are responsible for registering marriages of "non-Muslims"; thus, their competence is not limited to Christians or Jews. It adds that Art. 12 of the Constitution grants freedom of belief, which means that every citizen has the right to adhere to the Baha'i faith or even to be an apostate, and that the application of the shari'a rules for apostasy is not permissible according to Art. 12. Thus, the registration offices are required to examine all marriage contracts submitted to them, even if they concern Baha'is. However, after thoroughly examining a specific contract, a judge may, at his discretion, come to the conclusion that the marriage is invalid. In the pre-Nasserite era, it was common for Baha'is to register their religious affiliation as "Baha'i" on official documents.50
In 1954, the Ministry of Health informed the Ministry of the Interior that a number of persons had attempted to register their newborn and deceased in birth and death records as "Baha'is". If the state accepted this practice, Baha'is might regard this as an implicit recognition of their religion. The State Council's fatwa department was asked for an opinion. It argued that the Baha'i faith has no legal basis, which, it said, was proven by the State Council's judgment of 1952 on the question of the marriage allowance. This argument, however, is based on a false understanding of the judgment of 1952, which had dealt with the status of a Baha'i apostate, not with that of the Baha'i faith itself. Nevertheless, the fatwa department concluded that Baha'is, whose religion is not legally recognized, should draw a straight line in the space in which they are supposed to enter their religious affiliation. The Ministry of the Interior followed this recommendation and gave it as a directive to its subordinate branches. Grand mufti Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf issued a fatwa in which he explicitly approved of this decision.51 As a result of the ministry's decision, it was generally recognized that drawing a straight line in the space signifies that one is a Baha'i. After 1960, government employees exerted increasing pressure on Baha'is to enter an officially recognized religion on their documents. This led to a situation in which the religious affiliation that was entered into the documents nearly always depended on the clerk in the registration office, who was often badly informed about government policies on this matter. As a result, many Egyptian Baha'is are officially registered as Baha'is, whereas others are registered as Christians, Muslims, or as having no religion.52
In 1983, the Administrative Court in the State Council, in its function as an appeal court, decided a case relating to this issue. A young Baha'i, born to Baha'i parents and a student at the Faculty of Education of the University of Alexandria, had been denied an identity card because he insisted on entering his religious affiliation as "Baha'"'. As a result, he was expelled from university, because, as a male student, he was required to submit an identity card in order to prove that he was not trying to evade military service by not registering with state authorities. The Court argued that the plaintiff had not only the right, but also the duty to apply for an identity card which contained an entry about religious affiliation. The plaintiff was required to inform the state about his true religion, even if this religion is not recognized by the state. The state has a substantial interest in knowing the real status of its citizens. The court regarded Law No. 263/1960 as irrelevant in this context, because this law had only dissolved the Baha'i institutions, but did not attempt to end the presence of individual Baha'is in Egypt. Even in times of shari'a rule (i.e. before the beginning of the nineteenth century), the court said, there had always been religious minorities in Muslim countries who were neither Muslim nor dhimmi, even if they could not claim official recognition or treatment equal to that of dhimmls. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff legitimately had insisted on receiving an identity card that mentioned his religion as "Baha'i", and that the authorities had the duty of issuing such an identity card. However, it also held that the plaintiff's expulsion from the university was valid, firstly because the university was not obligated to consider the reasons why the plaintiff did not possess an identity card, and secondly because the plaintiff should not be allowed to study at the Faculty of Education since, as a Baha'i, it was not appropriate for him to become a teacher who would teach Egyptian children.53
In 1952, the State Council's fatwa department had declared that the Ministry of Education did not have the right to remove a Baha'i teacher from service merely on the basis of her religion, as the Constitution guaranteed freedom of belief. This statement by the State Council apparently has never served as a precedent; it is not quoted in subsequent decisions and legal statements or in the press. The State Council dealt with two more administrative law cases in the 1950s. In 1955, the fatwa department issued a statement on the Baha'is' attempt to register their publishing house as a welfare foundation (mu'assasa khayriyya). In this statement, the Council argued that Law No. 49/1945 allowed the registration only of those foundations whose aims or methods did not contradict public order, good morals or security. It added that the Baha'i faith is in conflict with all revealed religions. The publication of Baha'i teachings would violate the religious feelings of all believers and thus constitutes an attack on public order and security.54 In 1959, the administrative court in the State Council decided that the Ministry of the Interior had acted legitimately when it refused to grant Egyptian citizenship to a Baha'i with permanent residence in Egypt. It argued that the Baha'i faith constitutes apostasy and that an apostate may not become part of the Egyptian people (la yajuz li' l-murtadd an yandamij fi 'l-usra alMisriyya). The source does not give details of the case or the verdict.55 Although the court referred to the Islamic legal category of apostasy, it apparently did not examine the case in the light of the shari'a. It considers the entire Baha'i religion to constitute apostasy, whereas no fatwa on the Baha'i faith has ever mentioned apostasy in any sense other than that of an individual infraction. Muftis condemn the Baha'i faith, but the term "apostasy", in their usage, is limited to the individual act of conversion and is not used to describe the Baha'i community or the Baha'i religion.
Questions of administrative law have arisen only with the advent of the modern nation state and are not part of classical shari'a law. In this area of law, fatwas play a minor role. The Grand mufti's role, if any, is limited to agreeing with government decisions. The State Council included "Islamic" arguments in its decisions, but did so in a superficial manner, not going beyond giving a vague moral justification for its reasoning. Technical arguments or references to public order prevail. The decision of 1983, for example, contains detailed and logical arguments about whether or not a Baha'i should receive an identity card that mentions his religious affiliation; the reference to the status of religious minorities in "times of shari'a rule", however, is clearly the weakest part of the reasoning, as it is imprecise and does not refer to any substantial legal norm. The section concerning the Baha'i student's expulsion from university is short and seems to be driven largely by moral considerations rather than by legal arguments. 
Criminal law
Only one fatwa deals with the field of criminal law, and it does so only because Grand mufti Ahmad Haridi was explicitly asked for a fatwa by the public prosecutor in the case of a man who was registered as a Muslim, had been arrested as a member of a Baha'i community, but denied having embraced the Baha'i faith. Haridi decided that if the person was born Muslim and had embraced the Baha'i faith thereafter, then he was to be treated as an apostate. In this case, the court or religious scholars should explain his error to him, and he should be given the opportunity to repent. If he did not repent, he must be killed. But as he obviously denied being a Baha'i, it was sufficient for him to attest to his allegiance to Islam in front of witnesses.56 The mufti apparently wanted to emphasize that shari'a law considers the killing of an apostate to be a last resort. He does not mention the fact that state law does not provide any legal basis for sentencing an apostate to death-apostasy is not a crime under Egyptian law.
The Thus, without referring to specific shari'a rules or openly declaring the supremacy of shari'a law, the court manages to interpret constitutional rights in a way that limits their meaning and validity to religions recognized by Islam. It also strips the relevant articles of the Constitution of any substantial meaning. The judgment does not address the question of why the legislator should guarantee freedom of belief and at the same time limit the concept to freedom of internal belief, which does not really need to be guaranteed, as it cannot be easily be infringed upon. The court's reasoning with respect to protection against religious discrimination as guaranteed by the Constitution is contradictory: a provision that is meant to ensure equal treatment only of members of the same religion cannot provide any protection against religious discrimination.
The Supreme Court, in this verdict, takes it for granted that Islam is the sole basis for deciding upon the acceptance or rejection of a religion; but it only superficially discusses the central question of why it should be that way, referring to earlier constitutions and to the protocols of the Constituent Assembly of 1923 (not 1971!). Since the 1950s, the Egyptian judiciary has largely avoided a thorough discussion of the relationship between shari'a law and constitutional guarantees with respect to new religious communities, summarily equating state-approved religions with religions recognized by classical Islamic law in the core lands of the Muslim world, i.e. Islam, Judaism and Christianity.
Conclusions
Egyptian courts have regularly drawn on shari'a regulations where suitable, mainly in the area of personal status law. However, for the past forty years, courts have been confronted primarily with problems of administrative and criminal law, where shari'a norms are either not applicable or non-existent. This does not mean that courts do not justify their decisions in religious terms. But rather than employing methods and arguments drawn from classical shari'a sources, they declare the shari'a an important pillar of public order and define the boundaries of constitutional rights on the basis of public order.
Many courts presume that the shari'a rejects the Baha'i faith as a whole, which is problematic, as fatwas and the few court judgments that actually base their argument on Islamic law deal only with individual cases, mostly of apostasy, but not with the status of the Baha'i community itself. It remains unclear whether the courts base their assumption that shari'a law rejects the Baha'i faith on the fact that the Baha'i faith is not a revealed religion according to Islamic standards and therefore has no dhimma status, or on an idea of collective apostasy. Apparently, the reference to Islam serves as general justification and not as a precise legal argument.
The simple act of declaring the Baha'i faith incompatible with Islam does not lead to an "Islamic" solution to complicated problems, e.g. Baha'is who want to register their religious affiliation as "Baha'i". Neither state law nor shari'a regulations are of any help on this issue, which was produced by the emergence of a nation state that places great emphasis on the religious affiliation of its citizens. Consequently, the legal situation is obscure with respect to this question.
Egyptian muftis have issued clear opinions on the legal status of individual Baha'is-for the most part, formerly Muslim Baha'isin all areas of personal status law. These opinions have often been taken into consideration by the courts; sometimes, the judiciary or the executive has requested such expertise as a guideline for its decisions. However, most of those cases date from before the abolition of the Shari'a Courts in 1955. After 1960, Egyptian Baha'is have refrained from attempting to settle their conflicts of personal status law in court. As a consequence, the number of fatwas issued on this subject has declined.
The muftis clearly focus on cases of apostasy that can be solved easily on the basis of classical shari'a literature. They tend to avoid more complicated issues for which classical Islamic law does not provide definite solutions, especially the question of Baha'is of nonMuslim descent. This issue has been addressed only by Yusuf alQaradawi, but even he does not discuss the legal consequences of his categorization of such persons as polytheists. After all, this is an unprecedented problem for Islamic law-the existence of a postQur'anic religion in the Islamic world that is not only an offshoot of Islam, but defines itself as an independent religion and attracts converts from other non-Islamic religious communities. Egyptian muftis, however, make no attempt to find a genuine solution to this legal problem, preferring to apply traditional categories-mainly apostasywhere suitable and to ignore cases that do not have an obvious solution. The question of ijtihad as a tool for creating solutions to new legal problems has not been discussed in Egypt in this context. This is also true with regard to the legal consequences of apostasy, which are not always as easy to solve as are cases involving marriage and inheritance law.
The muftis concentrate on the secondary consequences of apostasy in personal status law and neglect the primary consequence, namely the death sentence that is to be imposed if the apostate does not repent. They generally are reluctant to deal with topics that are not governed by Islamic law, like penal law and administrative law. This is true even of Rashid Rida and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who had no institutional link to the state judiciary and whose fatwas are not limited to the discussion of concrete cases. Of the two fatwas that deal with criminal and administrative law, one offers a solution that realistically can be adopted by the state executive instead of merely calling for the apostate's execution, and the other one contents itself with approving the state's decision on dealing with Baha'is' official documents.
Of the remaining fatwas, only the most recent one, issued by Jadd al-Haqq, mentions the duty to kill an apostate. Subsequently, in his capacity as Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq issued two official state-ments on the Baha'i faith that reveal his continuing harsh stance towards this religion.62
The fact remains that rigorous rejection of the Baha'i faith does not solve the practical problems caused by the continuing presence of Baha'is in Egypt. In 1998, a dispute arose at Cairo University regarding the promotion of a teacher at the Faculty of Dentistry who was known to be a Baha'i. Some faculty members who were opposed to her promotion on religious grounds turned to al-Azhar's fatwa committee for an opinion. The resulting fatwa states that "whoever belongs to this sect is an apostate ... In Egypt, the Azhar 'ulama' and shari'a jurisdiction and the government fought them [viz., the Baha'is]." The fatwa then refers to three previous fatwas by Azhar institutions and to the State Council's decision of 1952 and concludes: "As has been shown in this short summary, the Baha'i faith is a false creed that has nothing in common with Islam, nor does it belong to Judaism and Christianity, and the Muslim who embraces it is an apostate and has left Islam."63 This unambiguous assessment fails to provide any solution for the problem at hand, which may partly be due to the fatwa committee's wish not to become entangled in the political struggle between Islamist and secularist factions at Cairo University. In any case, this recent fatwa is completely in line with the earlier Egyptian fatwas on the Baha'i faith, which readily apply rules from classical Islamic law to modern cases of Baha'i apostates, but avoid cases that would force them to adapt these rules or to create new rules. The problem is left to the courts, which apply the broader and more flexible concepts of state religion and public order. 
